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HOMOSEXUAL DISCRIMINATION AND
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT: SHAHAR V
BOWERS-THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS'
SHIELD OF PUBLIC ANIMOSITY
INTRODUCTION
Homosexual discrimination is a disease in this country.' In both
the public and private sectors, individuals and businesses legally
discriminate against homosexuals in employment, public housing,
and public accommodations.2 Moreover, the Supreme Court upheld
state laws prohibiting same-sex sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick.3
Because of the lack of adequate protection from civil rights statutes
and from the courts, homosexuals must fight for individual rights on
every front.
Homosexuals have instigated grass roots campaigns to fight this
class-wide discrimination. The 1996 decision by the Hawaii Supreme
Court in Baehr v. Leulu, for example, held that denial of same-sex
marriage licenses potentially violates Hawaii's constitution.4
1. In five major cities that kept records of hate crimes, including murder, against those
perceived to be gay, there was a 127% increase in anti-gay violence between 1988 and 1993.
See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BRIEFING PAPER 18 LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS 2
(1996) [hereinafter AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION].
2. See MOHR, infra note 180, at 173.
3. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia's prohibition of homosexual sodomy).
4. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (1996) (evaluating the prohibition of same-sex marriages
under a "strict scrutiny" standard), reh 'g granted in part 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993). After
rehearing, the trial court determined that denial of same-sex marriage failed to satisfy the
Hawaii Supreme Court's strict scrutiny standard. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL
694235, at *21 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). On April 29, 1997, "[b]oth houses of the Hawaii
legislature ... approved a constitutional amendment that would expand the power of state
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Although Baehr represented a partial victory for the homosexual
movement, it also instigated much anti-gay legislation. Since
Hawaii's decision, legislators in 49 states have proposed prohibitions
of same-sex marriages, and have succeeded in 25 of those states.5
Likewise, the United States Senate quickly passed the Defense of
Marriage Act ("DOMA"), which permitted states to refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.
6
Efforts against employment discrimination are at the forefront of
the homosexual rights agenda as most individuals in a free-market
economy need employment to survive. In 1996, the United States
Senate considered employment discrimination against homosexuals
when it voted on the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
("ENDA"). 7 Notwithstanding the ardent support of civil rights
activists, ENDA failed by one vote to pass into legislation.
8
Compounding this defeat, only 9 states have passed legislation
similar to ENDA that makes it illegal to revoke a person's
employment because of actual or perceived sexual orientation.
9
Because federal and state legislatures have failed to protect
adequately homosexuals' employment, homosexuals have taken the
fight to the courts to protect their rights.
In this anti-gay climate, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
lawmakers to restrict marriages to opposite-sex couples, while also granting lesbian and gay
couples a portion of the benefits available to married couples." See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, April 1997 Press Releases, Haivaii Sends Constitutional Amendment to Voters to Ban
Lesbian and Gay Marriages (Apr. 29, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org/news/n042997b.html>.
5. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Lesbian and Gay Rights: Marriage,
Statewide Anti-Gay Marriage Lavs (last modified Jan. 1998) <http:llwww.aclu.org/Issues/gay/
gaymar.html>. The states that have passed anti-gay marriage laws in response to the Baehr
decision are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah and
Virginia. See id. In 1996, for example, the Georgia Legislature passed a bill that prohibited
same-sex marriages and denied recognition of same-sex marriages licensed by other states. GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1998).
6. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. H 1996).
7. S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996). Proponents reintroduced the Act in 1997. S. 869, 105th
Cong.
8. S. 2056, 142 CONG. REC. 10, 129-39 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996).
9. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 1, at 1. "Nine states, the District
of Columbia, and over 200 municipalities.., ban homosexual discrimination in employment."
Id. These states are: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. See id.
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Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a government employer
could permissibly revoke an employment offer to a lesbian due to her
sexual orientation.' 0 The court in Shahar v. Bowers concluded that
the government employer's interest in maintaining a non-
controversial office outweighed the employee's First Amendment
right to intimate association." Shahar's significance lies in the
court's tacit approval of apparent public animosity toward
homosexuals as a justification for the discriminatory decision by the
government employer.
Denying homosexuals equal employment opportunities because of
their sexual orientation amounts to denying them their constitutional
rights on a class-wide basis. This discrimination is a regressive step
in the civil rights movement. The only potential benefit of the Shahar
decision is the possibility that the heterosexual majority will realize
the widespread discrimination aimed at homosexuals and, perhaps,
push for adequate legislation putting homosexuals on an equal
footing in employment matters with the rest of the public.
This note analyzes the Shahar case in terms of government
employment in general and in terms of the public perception of
homosexuals as an unconstitutional justification for government
employment decisions in particular. Part I examines the judicial
doctrine of First Amendment rights and government employment and
establishes the background of judicial doctrine under Pickering v.
Board of Education and its progeny, including the general factors
derived from these cases. Part II of the note begins by describing in
detail the majority opinion from the Shahar case and also delineates
its concurring and dissenting opinions as these opinions relate to
public perception of homosexuals. Part III compares the majority's
opinion in Shahar with the case law detailed in Part I and with the
dissenting opinions in Part II. Part IV proposes that Shahar prevents
homosexuals from having equal government employment
opportunities, which denies homosexuals their First Amendment
rights. Finally, the conclusion analyzes the implications of Shahar in
reference to Parts III and IV of the note, and suggests that
10. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693
(1998). See infra notes 108-25 and accompanying text.
11. Id. See infra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
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employment protection for homosexuals should come not only from
legislatures, but also from the courts.
I. HISTORY
A. The First Amendment and Government Employment
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the conflict between a government employer's
interests in maintaining an efficient and productive office and a
government employee's First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.1 2 The Board of Education for a high school in Illinois
dismissed an instructor because he sent a letter to a local newspaper,
in connection with a proposed tax increase that criticized past
allocation of funds by the Board.13 The Board claimed that the letter
was "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the
schools of the district," and that the relevant Illinois statute required
the instructor's dismissal.' 4 The instructor argued that the First
Amendment right of free speech protected his writing the letter.'5
The Court held that, absent proof of false statements, a teacher's
exercise of free speech on matters of public concern does not justify
his dismissal from public employment. 16 The Court reached its
holding by balancing the First Amendment interests of the teacher, as
12. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
13. See id. at 564. In December 1961, the voters passed a Board proposal that raised
$5,500,000 to build two new schools within the district. Id. at 565. In May and September 1964,
the taxpayers rejected two other Board proposals to raise additional funds. Id. at 566. Marvin
Pickering, an instructor for the school district, wrote a letter to a local newspaper after the
funding proposals failed. Id. The letter criticized the Board's handling of the 1961 bond issue
proposals and its allocation of funds between the school's educational and athletic programs, Id.
The letter also accused the superintendent of attempting to prevent teachers from criticizing or
opposing the bond issue proposal. Id. The Board dismissed Pickering for publishing the letter in
a local newspaper. Id.
Pursuant to Illinois law, the Board held a hearing on the dismissal and found the statements
in Pickering's letter to be false. The Board failed to introduce evidence that the letter adversely
affected the community or the administration. Id. at 566, 567. The Illinois courts, including the
Illinois Supreme Court, held that Pickering's dismissal was constitutional and affirmed the
Board's dismissal of Pickering. Id. at 565, 567. Pickering appealed to the United States
Supreme Court on the free speech claim. Id. at 565.
14. Id. at 564-65.
15. Id. at 565.
16. Id. at 574.
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a citizen, against the state's interests, as an employer, in promoting
the effectiveness of the public service rendered through its
employees. 17
According to the Court's reasoning, the instructor's statements
were not directed toward any person with whom the instructor had
close contact in the course of his employment. 8 Furthermore, the
Court recognized that the relationship between teachers and the
Board lacked personal loyalty.19 In dictum, however, the Court noted
the possibility that, for some positions in government employment,
even true statements made by an employee might provide proper
grounds for dismissal.2 °
The Supreme Court carved out an exception to the Pickering rule
in Elrod v. Burns.21 In Elrod, a county sheriffs office discharged
Republican non-civil-service employees because they were not
affiliated with or sponsored by the newly elected sheriffs
Democratic Party.22 The Court held that patronage dismissals were
17. ld. at 568.
18. Id. at 569-70.
19. Id. at 570.
20. Id. at 570 n.3. The Court stated:
It is possible to conceive of some positions in public employment in which the need
for confidentiality is so great that even completely correct public statements might
furnish a permissible ground for dismissal. Likewise, positions in public employment
in which the relationship between superior and subordinate is of such a personal and
intimate nature that certain forms of public criticism of the superior by the subordinate
would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship between them
can also be imagined.
Id.
21. 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
22. Id. at 350-51. In December 1970, a Democrat replaced the incumbent Republican
Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois and fired several Republican non-civil-service employees, as
was the standard practice. Id. at 350, 351. The Department fired the public employees solely
because they did not support, belong to, or obtain the sponsorship of, the Democratic Party. Id.
The employees brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois and sought declaratory, injunctive, and other relief for violations of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 349, 350. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the employees the appropriate
preliminary injunctive relief. Bums v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 1975). The
Supreme Court granted the public employer's petition for certiorari. Elrod v. Bums, 423 U.S.
821 (1975).
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unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.23 The
benefit gained through patronage dismissals by the sheriff did not
outweigh, in the Court's perception, the loss of the employees'
constitutionally protected rights.24 According to the Court in Elrod,
patronage dismissals were not the least restrictive means of fostering
government efficiency in this case, and these dismissals severely
restricted political belief and association.25 However, the Court noted
that public employers retain the power, in some cases, to dismiss
policy-making employees, who serve as advisers or long term
planners, due to political affiliation in order to bar potential
obstruction of political administration.26
The Supreme Court refined the "policymaker" description in
Branti v. Finkel.27 In Branti, two Republican Assistant Public
Defenders brought suit to enjoin the Democratic Public Defender
from discharging them based on their political affiliation.28
Upholding the judgment of the court below, the Court held that the
position of assistant public defender fails to qualify as the type of
public office that can include a particular party affiliation as a job
23. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373.
24. Id.at363-73.
25. Id. at 372.
26. Id. at 367. The Court stated that:
No clear line can be drawn between policy-making and nonpolicy-making positions.
While nonpolicy-making individuals usually have limited responsibility, that is not to
say that one with a number of responsibilities is necessarily in a policy-making
position. The nature of the responsibilities is critical.... In determining whether an
employee occupies a policy-making position, consideration should also be given to
whether the employee acts as an adviser or formulates plans for the implementation of
broad goals.
Id. at 367-68.
27. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
28. Id. at 508-09. The Rockland County Legislature appoints a County Public Defender
for a term of six years. The Public Defender, in turn, appoints nine at-will assistants. Branti, a
Democrat, succeeded a Republican incumbent in the County Public Defender office, and began
executing termination notices for six assistants then in office. Id. at 509. Aaron Finkel and Alan
Tabakman, Republican assistants to Branti's predecessor, were among those terminated in favor
of Democratic assistants brought suit in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York in order to enjoining their dismissal. Id. at 508. The District Court entered a temporary
restraining order against Branti and, after an eight day hearing, permanently enjoined Branti
from terminating the assistants' employment because of their political beliefs. Id. at 508-09.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Finkel v. Branti, 598 F.2d 609 (2d
Cir. 1979).
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requirement. 29 According to the Court, the assistant public defender's
primary responsibility involved representing individual citizens in
adversarial proceedings against the State.3° Moreover, the Court
determined that although an assistant could obtain confidential
information from attorney-client relationships, such information
would not pertain to the public defender's office and would not
implicate political partisanship.31 Under these circumstances, the
Court concluded that to permit tenure in the public defender's office
to be dependent upon political affiliation undermined the effective
performance of the office.32 The Court qualified its holding, however,
by stating that it did not necessarily apply to District Attorneys.33
Three years after Branti, in Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court
refined Pickering and established a multi-stage analysis for
evaluating First Amendment free speech claims within the realm of
government employment. 34  In Connick, the Court applied its
Pickering test to the claim of an Assistant District Attorney who was
discharged because she expressed discontent with the District
Attorney's staffing decisions and distributed an office questionnaire
concerning office policy and morale.35 First, the Court determined
29. Branti, 445 U.S. at 520.
30. Id. at 519.
31. Id.
32. Id. at519-20.
33. Id. at 519 n.13. The public defender's responsibilities were "in contrast to the broader
public responsibilities of an official such as a prosecutor... We express no opinion as to
whether the deputy of such an official could be dismissed on grounds of political party
affiliation or loyalty." Id.
34. 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
35. Id. at 140-41. Petitioner, New Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick, employed
Sheila Myers as an Assistant District Attorney responsible for trying criminal cases. Id. When
Connick informed Myers of his plan to transfer her to prosecute cases in a different section of
the criminal court, she strongly opposed his plan, expressed her discontent to several of her
supervisors, and distributed a questionnaire to other Assistant District Attorneys in the
Department, which concerned several Department deficiencies, including whether employees
felt pressured to work on political campaigns. When Connick learned of Myers' actions, he
terminated her employment with the Department. Id.
Myers filed a § 1983 action in Federal District Court, claiming that Connick violated her
First Amendment right to free speech by terminating her employment. Id. The district court
agreed with Myers and ordered her reinstated. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 760 (E.D.
La. 1981). The court of appeals later affirmed the district court's decision. Myers v. Connick,
654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court granted Connick's writ of certiorari. Connick
v. Myers, 455 U.S. 999 (1982).
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that the Assistant District Attorney's speech was a matter of public
concern.36 Second, the Court determined that under the Pickering test
the State's interests in promoting efficiency in the public service it
performs through its employees outweighed the employee's First
Amendment interests in this case.37 The Court noted that, although
the public employer's burden to justify the discharge of a public
employee varied depending upon the nature of the employee's
expression, a government employer need not wait for the disruption
or destruction of the office's function before discharging the
censurable party.
38
To summarize, the courts use the Pickering balance test to assess
a public employee's First Amendment claim against an adverse
employment action.39 If a public employee is a policymaker, then the
claim is governed by Elrod0° and Branti.41 Finally, free speech cases
trigger an analysis of the public concern implicated by the adverse
employment decision, as established in Connick.42
36. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. The Court held that:
[WMhen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction the
employee's behavior....
[W]hether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the
whole record.
Id. at 147-48. The Court concluded that respondent's inquiry regarding pressure upon
employees to work in political campaigns fell under the rubric of matters of public concern. Id.
at 149.
37. Id. at 149-54. Connick's interest in maintaining an efficient office outweighed Myers'
limited First Amendment interests. Id. In Connick's favor, the Court noted that: (1) the
statement could undermine office relations; (2) Connick could reasonably have believed that
Myers endangered the Department's effectiveness by exercising her rights; and, (3) considering
the timing of the questionnaire, Connick could reasonably have believed that Myers threatened
his authority to lead the Department. Id. at 151-53.
38. Id. at 149-51.
39. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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B. General Factors
After analyzing the balance that occurs between the government
employers' interests and the employees' First Amendment rights, the
next step in understanding the First Amendment/government
employer issue requires an examination of the factors that the courts
use to make factual determinations in this type of case. Government
employers must justify the discharge of the government employee on
legitimate grounds.43 In performing the Pickering balance, courts
consider the manner and time, as well as the place, of the employee's
expression, and the context in which the dispute arose. 4" Within this
framework, the courts look to whether the expression: [1] impairs
discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers; [2] has a
detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal
loyalty and confidentiality are necessary, or (3) interferes with the
performance of the employee's duties or the regular operation of the
agency, including the public's perception of the agency.4 5 The
preceding factors establish a test for assessing the harm to the
employer.
In Waters v. Churchill, the Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether the government employer's perception of the facts must
be reasonable in order to outweigh an employee's rights under the
First Amendment.46 Using the Connick test, the Court reviewed a
government-funded hospital's decision to discharge a nurse.47 The
plurality considered both the facts as the employer perceived them
and the reasonableness of the employer's perception, and suggested
that when an employer's based upon extremely weak evidence, or no
evidence at all, such decisions might be unreasonable.48
43. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at
150).
44. See id. (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-53, and Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410,415, n.4 (1979)).
45. See id. (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-73).
46. 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality opinion).
47. Id. at 675-82.
48, Id. at 677. The plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor stated:
We think employer decision making will not be unduly burdened by having courts
look to the facts as the employer reasonably found them to be. It may be unreasonable,
for example, for the employer to come to a conclusion based on no evidence at all.
1999)
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Cases arising out of law enforcement apparently ignore the
Pickering balancing text altogether, to the advantage of the law
enforcement agency.49 Federal courts allow greater restrictions of
police officers' activities than of any other type of public employee, 0
and some circuits have even compared the need for discipline and
uniformity required in a police force with that required in the
military.5' The Supreme Court, however, stated that police
departments cannot subject officers to a "watered down version" of
the Constitution in a case in which officers exercised their freedom of
speech.52
Likewise, it may be unreasonable for an employer to act based on extremely weak
evidence when strong evidence is clearly available-if, for instance, an employee is
accused of writing an improper letter to the editor, and instead of just reading the
letter, the employer decides what it said based on unreliable hearsay.
Id. (emphasis in original).
49. See infra note 50.
50. Compare, e.g., Eggar v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 315-23 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
(holding that FBI could permissibly transfer agent after he publicly accused another agent of
giving false testimony); Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470,483 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding rational
connection between necessities of police department discipline and rule forbidding police
personnel from cohabiting with each other); Byrd v. Gain, 558 F.2d 553, 554 (9th Cir. 1977)
(stating that police power justifies use of a standard different from school employment cases);
Baron v. Meloni, 602 F. Supp. 614, 618 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that sheriff could
permissibly discharge a deputy for associating with the wife of a crime figure currently under
investigation); Jackson v. Howell, 577 F. Supp. 47, 50-51 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (finding no
constitutional infringement in discharge of a police officer because the officer manipulated
Department procedures by using an investigation of a woman's complaint to start a sexual affair
with the woman); Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612, 618 (W.D. Va. 1982) (upholding
Department regulations that were designed to prevent employees' conduct that could bring the
Department into disrepute); Fabio v. Civil Service Comm'n, 414 A.2d 82, 91 (Pa. 1980)
(holding that Department properly dismissed police officers because of conduct, which cast
poor light on Department), with Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 471-72 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that Department infringed police department clerk-typist's right to privacy when
it removed her from list of eligible applicants because she once had an affair with a married
policeman); Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Dept., 563 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (W.D. Mich.
1983), affd mem., 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding unconstitutional the discharge of
police officer for adulterous cohabitation); Swope v. Bratton, 541 F. Supp. 99, 108-09 (W.D.
Ark. 1982) (holding that Department could not demote a patrolman who cohabited with a
dispatcher).
51. See, e.g., Shawgo v. Spradling, 701 F.2d 470, 483 (5th Cir. 1983); Vorbeck v.
Schnicker, 660 F.2d 1260, 1263 (8th Cir. 1981).
52. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
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C. Public Perception Generally
In several peculiar cases, a governmental agency claimed harm
because an employee's expression tarnished the public's perception
of the agency. 3 The courts vary as to the appropriate evidentiary
burden, but all mandate that the prediction of harmful public
perception be reasonable. 4
For example, in Lumpkin v. Jordan,55 the Mayor of San Francisco
removed a pastor from the city's Human Rights Commission for
publicly stating that homosexuality was an "abomination" and
implying that all homosexuals should be put to death. 6 The court
found, in light of the public uproar, that the pastor's statements
compromised the Commission's reputation for promoting equal
opportunity and good will for all people. 7
Furthermore, in Zook v. Brown, a Sheriff disciplined a deputy,
according to pertinent regulations, for publishing a letter endorsing
one of several ambulance services used by the Department.5 8 The
Seventh Circuit held that the Sheriff Department's interest in
maintaining the appearance of impartiality outweighed the deputy's
First Amendment rights.59
Likewise, in Wood v. Ruppe, the court upheld the discharge of a
Peace Corps volunteer who violated Peace Corps policy by publicly
demonstrating against American foreign policy, recognizing the vital
importance of the Corps' neutral image within the realm of politics.
60
53. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
55. No. C-93-4338 F75, 1994 WL 669852 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 1994).
56. Id. at *2.
57. Id. at *4. The court determined that the case file within Elrod's "policymaker"
exception because the city entrusted the pastor with an advisory role. Id. at *3. Because the
pastor's statement compromised the effectiveness of the Commission, the court held that his
removal did not violate his First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion.
Id. at *4-7.
58. 865 F.2d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 1989).
59. Id. at 891-92. The court reasoned that the rule regulating testimonial speech was
necessary to prevent the commercial and residential communities' perceptions of kickback
arrangements or conflicts of interest, and concluded that government employees must avoid
undue influence both in fact and in appearance. Id. at 891.
60. 659 F. Supp. 403, 406-12 (D.D.C. 1987). The court suggested that where the evidence
suggested that a volunteer's speech directly threatened the Peace Corps' policy on neutrality,
courts must uphold the enforcement of such policies. Id. at 411-12.
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The factor of public perception, however, does not always favor
the public employer. In Briggs v. North Muskegon Police
Department, the court held unconstitutional a city police
department's dismissal of a married police officer for cohabiting with
a married woman who was not his wife.6' The court reasoned that the
purpose of the constitutional protection of association was to prevent
"majoritarian coercion," and that, therefore, the general community
disapproval failed to justify the department's discharge of the police
officer.62
Similarly, in Latino Officers Association, New York, Inc. v. City of
New York,63 the court granted plaintiffs request for a preliminary
injunction and held that the New York City Police Department
violated certain Latino officers' constitutional rights by refusing to
allow the officers to participate in several parades in an official
capacity in organizations not recognized by the department. 64 For
lack of evidence, the court rejected the department's argument that
the police officers inability to choose unrecognized organizations as a
forum for expression would potentially create a public perception of
the department as disunited.65
The remainder of this note focuses on the Eleventh Circuit's
jurisprudence under the Pickering balancing test. As have other
Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has developed a significant body of
case law interpreting Pickering and its progeny.
D. Overview of the Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit imposes a greater proof requirement upon a
government employer than that suggested by the plurality of the
61. 563 F. Supp. 585, 586-92 (W.D. Mich. 1983). The court rejected the police
department's argument that the public would lose faith in the department because of the
officer's illegal off-duty conduct. Id. at 590.
62. Id. at 592 (citing Fabio v. Civil Service Comm'n, 414 A.2d 82, 88 (Pa. 1980)). The
court warned that public employers should not transform public notions of unacceptable social
behavior into legal conformity. Id.
63. 97 Civ. 1384 (KM\,V) 1997 WL473972 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1997).
64. Id.at*1-6.
65. Id. at *5. The court stated that the department needed to present evidence showing the
differences in the impact on public perception by recognized organization as opposed to an
unrecognized organization. Id. Because the Department presented no such evidence, the
Pickering balance tipped in favor of the police officers' constitutional rights. Id.
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Supreme Court in Waters v. Churchill.66 For example, in McCabe v.
Sharrett, the Eleventh Circuit held that a police chief permissibly
transferred a personal secretary who married a lower-level police
officer.67 Because the police chief submitted substantial evidence that
an effective personal secretary must demonstrate both loyalty to the
employer and the ability to keep work-related information
confidential, the court found that the police chief's considerations of
disloyalty were not merely subjective but were objectively reasonable
as a matter of his attenuated experience.68
In addition, consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in
Branti and Elrod, the Eleventh Circuit has given little weight to a
policy-making government employee's interest in working in a
policy-making position when the employee's political affiliation
differs from that of the employer. For example, in Bates v. Hunt, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Governor of Alabama could
permissibly discharge an assistant without unconstitutionally
burdening the employee's free speech rights.69 In Bates, the
Governor's assistant signed an affidavit supporting a former
employee who brought suit against the Governor. 70 Because the
assistant's position constituted a policy-making role, the Bates court
reasoned that the Governor "is not required to let [an adversary]
represent him.
' 71
The Eleventh Circuit also takes a more critical view of police
agencies than other circuits.72 In Waters v. Chaffin, the Eleventh
Circuit held that a police chief violated a subordinate officer's First
Amendment rights by disciplining the officer, who criticized him
while off duty, out-of-uniform, in another jurisdiction, and to another
officer.73 The Chaffin court recognized that cases that have arisen
from law enforcement contexts stand for the proposition that a police
66. 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality opinion). See also supra notes 46-48 and
accompanying text.
67. 12 F.3d 1558, 1573 (11 th Cir. 1994).
68. Id. at 1571-73.
69. 3 F.3d 374, 378 (11 th Cir. 1993).
70. Id. at 376.
71. Id. at 378.
72. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
73. 684 F.2d 833, 834 (1 th Cir. 1982).
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chief needs only a reasonable prediction of harm to justify the
challenged act.74 This rule, however, seemed to the Eleventh Circuit
to be less appropriate in cases in which the subordinate police officer
and the police chief had never worked closely together.7' Finally,
because the subordinate police officer's expression occurred outside
his official capacity, the Chaffin court weighed the subordinate's First
Amendment rights more heavily than the police chief's interest in
loyalty.
76
Contrary to the result in Chaffin, however, the Eleventh Circuit
decided in McMullen v. Carson that a police chief could fire a low-
level at-will employee after the community strongly protested the
employee's televised announcement that he recruited for the Ku Klux
Klan." In balancing the respective interests, the McMullen court
noted that the Klan has a history of violent activity, both actual and
perceived, and intended to sow fear and tension between white and
Black Americans.78 The court also recognized that the Black
74. Id. at 839-40.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 837-40.
77. 754 F.2d 936 (1lth Cir. 1985). The Duval County Sheriff's Department hired
McMullen as a temporary full-time clerk in the records office in October 1981. Id. at 937. At
about the same time, McMullen applied to join the Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan. Id. By January 1992, McMullen recruited for the Klan on his own time by
distributing literature in various public areas. Id.
Sometime after the plaintiff joined the Klan, vandals left a cross in the yard of a black
woman's residence. Id. The Klan subsequently held a press conference to deny any involvement
in the vandalism. Id. The evening news broadcasted the conference, and MeMullun identified
himself as a Klan recruiter and as a Sheriff's Office employee. Id.
The Black community instantly protested the Sheriff's Office's ties with the Klan. Id.
Many live comments suggested that Black citizens should resist arrest by Sheriff's personnel
for "fear of their lives." Id. Sheriff Carson immediately discharged McMullen, fearing the
erosion of the Department's credibility in the Black community. Id. Ten days after his
dismissal, McMullen, his wife, and four others donned their Klan robes and protested at the
county courthouse. Id. A crowd gathered outside the courthouse where some minor violence
broke out. Id. In late 1982 or early 1983, McMullen resigned from the Klan. Id.
78. Id. at 938. From testimony and uncontested evidence, the record revealed that:
[T]he nature, both actual and perceived, of the Klan [is] a violent, criminal, and racist
organization dedicated to the sowing of fear and mistrust between white and black
Americans .... [Tlhe public makes no distinction in its perception of the Klan as a
monolithic entity composed of a "small group of violent extremists who are imbued
with fanatic dedication to racist ideas." The perception exists widely throughout the
country[.]
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community's relationship with the Sheriffs Office had been severely
strained over the years. 79 Balancing the history of the Klan and the
community situation against the employee's First Amendment rights,
the court concluded that the sheriffs need for the community's trust
outweighed the employee's constitutional rights.
80
E. Summary
Case law formulated under Pickering and its progeny established
a broad spectrum of analysis in cases involving the First Amendment
and government employment. On one end of the spectrum, a
government employer has no compelling interest to require its low-
level, non-civil service employees to relinquish their constitutional
rights. 81 On the other end of the spectrum, however, a government
employer retains significant interest in censoring upper-level, policy-
making employees whose constitutional rights compromise both the
inner functions and the public image of the agency. 2 Evidently,
courts give great deference to government employers in discharging
at-will employees. The following case illustrates how courts often
misapply the Pickering balance to reach a seemingly unjust result.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 940. The court stated:
The reaction of the community cannot always dictate constitutional protections to
employees. We hold only that a law enforcement agency does not violate the First
Amendment by discharging an employee whose active participation in an organization
with a history of violent activity, which is antithetical to enforcement of the laws by
state officers, has become known to the public and created an understandably adverse
public reaction that seriously and dangerously threatens to cripple the ability of the law
enforcement agency to perform effectively its public duties.
Id. Moreover, the court suggested that whether or not McMullen made any arrests, the Black
community would still "categorically distrust the Sheriff's Office if a known Klan member"
were permitted employment. Id. at 939. Likewise, McMullen's coworkers knew that "serious
conflict was inevitable considering the number of blacks working" close to McMullen. Id.
81. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 21-33, 55-57 and accompanying text.
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III. SHAHAR V BOWERS 3
A. History
Attorney Robin J. Shahar is a lesbian. 4 While attending Emory
University law school, Shahar worked as a law clerk for the Attorney
General's office for the State of Georgia (the "Department") during
the summer of 1990.85 In September 1990, during her final year in
law school, Shahar accepted an employment offer as a staff attorney
from the Department.8 6 Shahar's offer required her to begin working
in September 1991, after she graduated from law school.87
In November 1990, Shahar indicated on her public employment
forms that she was engaged and planned to marry Francine M.
Greenfield. 8 In June of 1991, Shahar told Deputy Attorney General
Robert Coleman that she was getting married at the end of July and
could start her employment near the end of September. 9 Soon after
this conversation, Coleman learned from a colleague that Shahar
intended to marry another woman.90
83. 114 F.3d 1097 (1 1th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
84. Id. at 1100.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Shahar was known as Robin Brown during her clerkship in the summer of 1990
and also when the Department offered her an employment position. Id. n.4. In response to the
"marital status" question on the employment application, Shahar wrote "engaged." Id.
Furthermore, Shahar changed "spouse's name" to read "future spouse's name" and wrote in her
partner's name, "Francine M. Greenfield." Id. at 1100.
Shahar started arranging wedding plans during the summer of 1990. Id. at 1100. Her Rabbi
announced her marriage to the congregation in Atlanta. Id. Approximately 250 people were
invited to the wedding, including two employees from the Department. Id. The invitations
indicated that the wedding was a "Jewish, lesbian-feminist, out-door wedding" to take place in
a public park in South Carolina in June 1991. Id.
Shahar married her fiancde under a reorganized branch of the Jewish faith, which supported
gay marriages. Shahar's religious foundations come from the Reconstructionist Movement of
Judaism. Id. Shahar and Greenfield have been significant participants in their synagogue
throughout their entire lives. Id. Their Rabbi, Sharon Kleinbaum, counseled them in eight
formal premarital sessions and many informal meetings. Rabbi Kleinbaum considers that the
union in which they joined is a public affirmation of their commitment to each other and to the
Jewish people, having no legal significance, but only personal and religious significance, and
that it can be terminated only by the church. Id. at 1119.
89. Id.at 1101.
90. Id. During the spring of 1991, Shahar and Greenfield were working on their wedding
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Acting according to his aides' advice, Attorney General Bowers
canceled Shahar's employment agreement in writing.91 The letter
indicated that Shahar's lesbian marriage would disrupt the
Department's function and that inaction by the Department would
indicate "tacit approval" of such marriages.92
Shahar brought an action in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia, claiming that Attorney General
Bowers violated her constitutional rights by canceling the
employment agreement because of her marriage to another woman. 93
Shahar alleged that Bowers, individually and in his official capacity,
violated her constitutional rights to freedom of association, freedom
of religion, equal protection, and substantive due process.94 Shahar
sought injunctive relief, including reinstatement, and compensatory
and punitive damages. 95 Both parties moved for summary judgment.96
invitations at a local restaurant in Atlanta. Id. During this meeting, they came across Elizabeth
Rowe, a paralegal in the Department, and Susan Rutherford, an attorney in the Department. Id.
The four women briefly discussed the wedding. Id. Rowe received an invitation to, and
attended, the wedding. Id.
In June 1991, Shahar told Deputy Attorney General Coleman that she was "getting married
at the end of July, changing her last name ... and ... would not be starting work with the
Department until mid-to-late September." Id. Shahar did not tell Coleman that she planned to
marry another woman. Id. Senior Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey Milsteen witnessed this
discussion between Shahar and Coleman and overheard Coleman congratulate Shahar on her
marriage. Id. Milsteen later learned from Rutherford, the attorney who had met Shahar's
fiancee, that Shahar planned to marry another woman. Milsteen informed the Attorney
General's senior aides of Shahar's wedding plans. Id.
91. Id. Viewing Shahar's lesbian marriage as potentially disruptive to the Department's
function, Bowers' senior aides held several meetings to discuss possible implications of
allowing a married lesbian to work in the office. Bowers did not attend these meetings because
of out-of-town obligations. Id.
92. Id at l101. The letterread:
[This action] has become necessary in light of information, which has only recently
come to my attention relating to a purported marriage between you and another
woman. As the chief legal officer of this state, inaction on my part would constitute
tacit approval of this purported marriage and jeopardize the proper function of this
office.
Id
93. Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859, 862 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
94. 114 F.3dat 1101.
95 Id.
96. Id.
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B. Position of the Parties and Procedural History
Attorney General Bowers contended that he did not cancel
Shahar's employment contract because of her lesbian status.
97
Bowers stated, rather, that Shahar had exercised poor judgment by
claiming to be married.98 In addition, Bowers and his aides
summarily concluded that Shahar's marriage affected the credibility
of the Department because her potential employment indicated
conflicting interpretations of Georgia law as it pertained to issues
regarding same sex marriage. 99 Bowers claimed that reasonable
Georgia citizens might suspect that having a lesbian Staff Attorney
married to another woman was equivalent to having a Staff Attorney
97. Shahar, 836 F. Supp. at 867 ("Defendant [Bowers] argues that the withdrawal of his
offer was motivated by neither plaintiffs classification as a homosexual nor by an intent to
discriminate against plaintiff on the basis of her sexual orientation.").
98. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1105-06.
99. Id. at 1105. These interpretations of Georgia law include claims to "same-sex
marriage licenses, homosexual parental rights, employee benefits, and insurance coverage of
'domestic partners."' Id. The Eleventh Circuit cited a number of events which indicated these
interpretations:
The controversy in the State of Georgia and the Attorney General's involvement at the
heart of that controversy, both as the State's litigator and its legal advisor, have not let
up since the Attorney General's 1991 decision to revoke the offer to Shahar. See In re
R.E.W., 472 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. 1996) (three-judge dissent from denial of certiorari to
review court of appeal decision holding restriction on father's visitation rights
inappropriate where based on his homosexual relationship); Christensen v. State,
S.E.3d 188, 190 (Ga. 1996) (in case involving same-sex solicitation in public rest area,
upholding-against challenge based on state constitution-statute criminalizing
solicitation of sodomy); City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517, 521 (Ga. 1995)
(striking down portion of Atlanta ordinance mandating provision of benefits to
registered "Domestic Partners"); Van Dyck v. Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853 (Ga. 1993)
(live-in lover statute inapplicable to attempt to modify alimony where former spouse
lived in meretricious same-sex relationship); Op. Att'y Gen. 96-7, 1996 WL 180274
(Ga.A.G.) (Attorney General called on to advise whether state college newspaper may
refise to publish advertisement suggesting that homosexuals are not "born gay" and
"[tihere is another way out" and containing text which "might be perceived to
'derogatorily describe homosexuals"); Op. Att'y Gen. 94-14 (1994 Ops. Att'y Gen.
Ga. 32 (Darby 1994)) (Attorney General called on to advise Insurance Commissioner
as to approval of proposed policy amendment affording group accident and health
coverage to "domestic partners"); Op. Att'y Gen. 93-26 (1993 Ops. Att'y Gen. Ga. 72
(Darby 1993)) (Attorney General called on to advise Insurance Commissioner
regarding "group health insurance provided pursuant to municipal ordinances which
create the status of domestic partnership").
Id. at 1104-05 n.16.
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who violates the State's laws against "homosexual" sodomy.100
Shahar argued that Bowers: (1) illogically equated her lesbian
relationship with sodomy, even though the Attorney General never
made the same assumption about heterosexual relationships; (2)
viewed Shahar's private life as inherently activist and political in
contrast to the deference accorded a heterosexual employee's private
life; and (3) considered Shahar too biased to handle controversial
cases involving homosexuality whereas heterosexuals were not
considered to have a similar conflict.
1°1
The district court found that Shahar had a constitutional right to
intimate association with her lesbian partner. 10 2 However, the court
100. Id. at 1105 n.17. Georgia actually makes no distinction between "homosexual"
sodomy and "heterosexual" sodomy. Under the Criminal Code of Georgia, "[a] person commits
the offense of sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1996).
Likewise, "[a] person commits the offense of solicitation of sodomy when he solicits another to
perform or submit to an act of sodomy." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-15 (1996). Since the
conclusion of Shahar's case, Bower v. State held that Georgia's sodomy laws violate the state
constitution's "Right to be left alone" and are therefore unconstitutional. 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga.
1998).
Bowers also suggested that Shahar's marriage would, disrupt the Department's ability to
handle controversial matters and conflict with the Department's duty to enforce Georgia's
sodomy laws. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101. Bowers stated that Shahar had "set him up" and
intended to use her position as a staff attorney "to advance a homosexual agenda." Id. at 1116
n,9 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
101. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1233 n.16, 70 (11th Cir. 1995). Shahar never
claimed that her marriage was legal under the Georgia's laws, and conceded that Georgia does
not recognize same-sex marriages. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1106. Shahar claimed that she
married outside the context of her employment and never asked the Department for marriage
benefits. Id. Bowers' predictions, according to Shahar, relied solely upon the Department's and
the public's prejudice. See Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1233-34.
102. Shahar, 836 F. Supp. at 863. The Supreme Court placed the right of intimate
association within the gamut of First Amendment protections in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In Roberts, a non-profit membership corporation brought suit to
prevent enforcement of a state law would compel two of its chapters to admit women in
violation of the corporation's bylaws. Id. at 615. On appeal, the Court distinguished two
separate association rights; namely, the right of intimate, and the right of expressive association.
Id. at 617-18.
The right of intimate association involved relationships with qualities such as "relative
smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and
seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship." Id. at 619-20. See, e.g., Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (regarding marriage); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816 (1977) (pertaining to the raising and education of children); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (concerning childbirth); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977) (regarding cohabitation with relatives).
The right of expressive association involved activities such as "speech, assembly, petition
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held that Bowers' interest as a public employer outweighed Shahar's
constitutional rights under the Pickering balancing test.
10 3
Accordingly, the district judge entered summary judgment on all
claims in favor of Bowers. 104
On appeal, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the summary judgment finding for Bowers on the free
exercise of religion, equal protection, and substantive due process
for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion." See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. In
Roberts, the Court held that the corporation lacked the distinctive characteristics both entities
afforded intimate, and entities afforded expressive, association rights. Id. at 621-29.
Whether Roberts actually placed the right of intimate association within the First
Amendment has been the subject of substantial debate by the courts. See New York State Club
Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1988) (relying on both Roberts and Rotary
International as precedent for the right of intimate association but without discussing specific
constitutional provisions); Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S.
537, 544-47 (1987) (stating that Roberts stood for the proposition that intimate association was
a First Amendment right); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1102 n.9 (1 th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, No. 97-751, 1998 WL 6489 (Jan. 12, 1998) (stating that Rotary Int'l located the origin
of the right of intimate association within the First Amendment); Hvamstad v. Suhler, 727 F.
Supp. 511, 517 (D. Minn. 1989), aff'd, 915 F.2d 1218, 1220 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that the
constitutional basis for a right of intimate association under the First Amendment is "somewhat
amorphous").
Scholars debate whether Roberts actually placed the right of intimate association within the
Fourteenth, rather than the First Amendment. See, e.g., Cornelia Sage Russell, Comment,
Shahar v. Bowers: Intimate Association and the FirstAmendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1479, 1489-
90 (1996), which stated:
[I]n contrast to [the Court's] treatment of expressive association, [it] did not identify
the particular provision(s) in the Constitution protecting intimate association.
However, the language [it] used to describe intimate association and the cases [it] cited
to support the doctrine come from the privacy cases traditionally associated with
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process.
This lack of specificity leaves Roberts open to several possible interpretations: (1)
intimate association is closely related to expressive association; like expressive
association it is encompassed within the First Amendment; (2) because the Supreme
Court has specifically identified expressive association with the First Amendment but
said nothing with respect to intimate association, the latter is not protected by the First
Amendment; (3) from the way intimate association is described in Roberts and the
cases cited in support of it, one can infer that it has constitutional sources, most likely
in the Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy; and (4) intimate association derives its
constitutional support from more than one source-that is, it is built on elements of
both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id.
103. Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. at 864-66.
104. Id.
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claims.105 A majority of the panel found that Shahar had a valid claim
to expressive association and vacated summary judgment on this
claim for possible reconsideration by the district court. 106 All three
judges upheld the district court's finding that Shahar had a right to
intimate association and vacated summary judgment on that claim,
remanding that portion of the decision to the district court for
evaluation under a strict scrutiny standard.
10 7
C. Judgment of the Eleventh Circuit Court ofAppeals Sitting En Banc
The Eleventh Circuit granted Bowers a rehearing en banc and
vacated its previous decision. 0 8 A twelve-judge panel affirmed the
district court's holding on all counts. 09 The court, however, issued
one concurring opinion and four dissenting opinions.' 10 The Supreme
Court denied Shahar's petition for certiorari.'n
1. The Majority Opinion
To avoid an unnecessary decision on the constitutional issues, the
majority assumed arguendo that Shahar had a First Amendment right
to intimate association with her lesbian partner and decided that the
Pickering balancing test applied in evaluating the constitutional
implications of Bowers' decision to cancel Shahar's employment
based on her lesbian marriage." 2 Under Pickering, the court held that
105. Shaharv. Bowers, 70 F.3d at 1226.
106. Id.
107. Id. For an in depth analysis of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, see Russell, supra note
102.
108. Shahar v. Bowers, 78 F.3d 499, 500 (11th Cir. 1996).
109. Shaharv. Bowers, 114 F.3d II11.
110. Id. at 1111-34 (Tjoflat, J., concurring and Godbold, S.J.; Barkett, J.; Kravitch, S.J.;
Birch, J., dissenting).
111. Shaharv. Bowers, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
112. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1102-03. Senior Circuit Judge Edmondson wrote for the majority.
Id. at 1099. Edmondson relied on two cases for the proposition that a court could properly
presume a party's constitutional nght for purposes of the Pickering balancing test. Id. at 1106
n. 19. In Kemp iv State Board of Agriculture, 803 P.2d 498 (Colo. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied,
501 US. 1205 (1991) the plaintiff, an employee of Colorado State University, invoked a
grievance proceeding claiming that the University gave her an insufficient pay increase because
of sex and race discrimination. Id. at 500. The employee requested a closed rather than an open
forum for her grievance proceeding. Id. After the closed proceedings were initiated, the
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Bowers did not violate Shahar's First Amendment right of intimate
association.113
The majority claimed to afford great weight to Shahar's presumed
First Amendment right of intimate association when it applied the
Pickering balance.114 Judge Edmonson, writing for the majority,
admitted, however, that the weight afforded to intimate association
under the Pickering balance does not result from a precise
mathematical formula." 5 Further, the court explained that, under the
Pickering balance, the factors weighing in favor of the government
need only be based on a reasonable assessment of the facts, and the
court must give substantial weight to the government officer's
employee contacted United States Senator William Armstrong (R. Colorado) and complained
about the irregularities of the grievance process. Id. When the University's officer in charge of
the investigation learned of the employee's attempt to bring in an outside party to the closed
forum, he canceled the proceeding, and the University's president affirmed the officer's
decision. Id. at 501. After the president's action, the employee sued the University for alleged
violation of her First Amendment rights of free speech and petition for grievances. Id.
The Colorado Supreme Court used the Pickering balance test, but never decided whether
the employee had waived her rights to free speech and petition of grievances by voluntarily
choosing a closed proceeding. Id. at 501-06. Instead, the Court applied the Pickering balance
and determined that the plaintiff's free speech argument did not implicate a matter of public
concern under Connick. Id. at 505. See also supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
Therefore, Pickering afforded her no protection. Kemp, 803 P.2d at 505. The court conclusions
in consideration of the employee's right to petition the government. Id. at 506.
In Shahar, Judge Edmondson also relied upon Barnard v. Jackson County, which
presumed a party's constitutional right for purposes of applying the Pickering balancing test. 43
F.3d 1218 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995); Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1106 n.19. In
Barnard, an auditor hired by the Jackson County Legislature to conduct an internal audit leaked
the results of his audit to a local, highly circulated newspaper. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1222. When
the legislature learned of the auditor's activities, it terminated his employment. Id. The auditor
sued the county, claiming violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. Id. The Eighth
Circuit applied the Pickering balance, presuming that the leaks touched on matters of public
concern, and concluded that the employer's interest outweighed the rights of the employee. Id.
at 1223-27.
113. 1d.at 1 I0-1 I.
114. Id. at 1I06.
115. Id. Judge Edmondson stated that:
Pickering balancing is never a precise mathematical process: it is a method of analysis
by which a court compares the relative values of the things before it. A person often
knows that "x" outweighs "y" even without first determining exactly what either 'x"
or "y" weighs. And it is this common experience that illustrates the workings of a
Picketing balance.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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view. 1 16
According to the majority, Bowers acted reasonably in relying
upon the information conveyed to him by his senior aides, even
without having personally consulted with Shahar.'1 7  The
reasonableness of Bowers' predictions, though, was the main focus of
the opinion.' 18
First, the majority noted that no appellate decision ever reinstated
116. Id. at 1106 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673-81 (1994) (plurality
opinion) ("[flor Pickering balance, facts to be weighed on government's side merely need to be
reasonable view of facts or reasonable predictions; manager's view of circumstances is entitled
to substantial weight")).
117. Shahar, 114F.3datl106n.18.
118. Id. at 1103-10. According to the majority, courts must allow public officials, such as
Bowers, to trust employees who help make policy decisions or handle confidential information
on the official's behalf. Id. at 1103-4 (citing Bates v. Hunt, 3 F.3d 374, 378 (1lth Cir. 1993);
Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 1992); Kinsey v. Salado
Independent School Dist., 950 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Pickering v. Board of Ed.,
391 U.S. 563, 570 n.3 (1968)).
Judge Edmondson stated:
Livas involved the termination of an assistant state's attorney for political patronage
reasons and, accordingly, the Seventh Circuit analyzed that claim under the test
developed by the Supreme Court for such cases. Though Shahar's case is not a
political patronage case and does not trigger the precise same concerns as those cases,
her case is analogous to Livas (and other political patronage cases involving
prosecutors). That is, the chief attorney ... must have a faith and confidence in his
professional legal staff that might not ordinarily be required in other areas of
government employment... So, in balancing the parties' interests, the chief attorney
must be given greater deference in his employment decisions than might be
appropriate in other areas of government employment. ...
At least before the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, we, in our Title VII
and Age Discrimination in Employment Act jurisprudence, held that assistant state
attorneys and the like-lawyers who serve at the pleasure of their policy-making
chief-were not employees protected by the statutes, but were members of the
personal staff of the chief lawyer- the position is one of policy-making level, involving
one who necessarily advises, and acts upon, the exercise of constitutional and legal
powers of the chief's office.... This "personal staff' ... idea embodies the general
and traditional proposition that positions of confidentiality, policy-making or acting
and speaking before others on behalf of the chief are truly different from other kinds of
employment. This point is central to the case now before us.
In deciding the present case, we put aside all other kinds of public employment; but,
in doing so, we do not say today that other kinds of employment would necessarily
lead to different results.
Id. at 1104 n.15.
The majority concluded that because of Bowers' elected position, he retained significant
discretion in hiring his office staff. Id. at 1104.
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a subordinate lawyer's employment over the chief lawyer's
objection. 9 Moreover, the court suggested that the weight afforded
to the government employer's interest in maintaining effective office
functioning may overcome the employee's intimate association
rights.120 In support of this contention, the majority relied upon
McCabe v. Sharrett, in which the Eleventh Circuit held that a police
chief permissibly transferred a secretary to a less desirable position
without violating her First Amendment right of intimate association,
because the secretary married an officer of the Sheriffs
department.
121
Furthermore, the majority observed that Shahar's suit transpired
against the backdrop of Georgia's aggressive efforts to enforce anti-
homosexual laws and the ongoing controversy of homosexual
marriage. 122 The court determined that Bowers reasonably concluded
the following: (1) Shahar's intimate involvement with her lover
would interfere with the Department's ability to enforce Georgia's
sodomy laws; (2) the public would perceive Shahar's marriage to
another woman as synonymous with violating Georgia's sodomy
laws, thereby harming the department's public image; (3) Shahar's
acts would confuse the public about her marital status and about
Bowers' attitude towards same-sex marriages; (4) Shahar's ability to
make good judgments on behalf of the Department was in doubt
because she failed to appreciate the Department's need to avoid
controversy, such as the controversy caused by her homosexual
119. Id. at 1104 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154-56 (1983), and Livas v.
Petka, 711 F.2d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 1983) ("One of the problems faced by a prosecutor such as
Petka, however, is that his policies are implemented by subordinates .... That Petka lost
confidence in Livas, for whatever reasons, is therefore sufficient justification for Livas'
dismissal.")).
120. 114 F.3d at 1106 (citing McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1569-70) (1 1th Cir. 1994)
(upholding transfer of Sheriffs secretary to less desirable job based on her marriage to an
officer in Sheriff's department).
121. 12 F.3d 1558, 1570 (11th Cir. 1994). See also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying
text. The McCabe court reasoned that, "the employer's interest will weigh more heavily in the
Pickering balance the more closely the challenged employment action serves the employer's
interest in the efficient and effective functioning of the office." Id.
122. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104-05. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-92
(1986) (holding that the Georgia statute that criminalized homosexual sodomy does not violate
substantive due process), and Christensen v. Georgia, 468 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ga. 1996) (holding
that the Georgia statute that criminalized homosexual solicitation of sodomy is constitutional).
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marriage.123 In light of the overall circumstances, the court concluded
that Bowers reasonably interpreted the facts and that his interest as a
public employer outweighed Shahar's constitutional rights. 124 The
majority's rationale and conclusions, however, met strong opposition
by five of the twelve judges sitting en banc.'25
2. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Judge Tjoflat, concurring, questioned whether the majority should
have applied the Pickering balance without first resolving the
constitutional issues raised by Shahar, stating that balancing cannot
occur without first identifying a constitutional right accruing to a
government employee and assigning a weight to that right.126 Judge
123. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1105-06. In support of his contention that Bowers could speculate
as to the reactions of the public, regarding the Department's commitment to enforce Georgia's
sodomy laws, Judge Edmondson stated:
About public perception, we accept that the fact the Shahars are professed lesbians and
see themselves as "married" does not prove beyond reasonable doubt that either of
them has engaged in sodomy within the meaning of Georgia law. But we also accept
that, when two people say of themselves that they are "married" to each other, it is
reasonable for others to think those two people engage in marital relations.
A United States Circuit Judge ... has written: "Sodomy is an act basic to
homosexuality." We cannot say that Georgia's Attorney General is clearly wrong to
worry that reasonable people-inside and outside the Law Department-in Georgia
could think along these same lines.... We acknowledge that some reasonable persons
may suspect that having a Staff Attorney who is part of a same-sex "marriage" is the
same thing as having a Staff Attorney who violates the State's law against homosexual
sodomy. So, we accept that Shahar's participation in a same-sex "wedding" and
"marriage" could undermine confidence about [Bowers'] commitment to enforce the
State's law against homosexual sodomy[.]
id. at 1105 n. 17 (citations omitted).
124. IdatI110-11.
125. Id. at 1111-34 (Tjoflat, J., concurring and Godbold, S.J.; Barkett, J.; Kravitch, S.J.;
Birch, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1116 (Tjoflat, J. concurring). Judge Tjoflat agreed with the majority's
conclusion that the district court properly granted Bowers summary judgment motion on all
claims. Id. at 1111. However, Judge Tjoflat stated that the majority should not have applied the
Pickering balance without first addressing the constitutional issues raised by Shahar. Id. at
1111-12. Judge Tjoflat asserted the following in support of this contention:
I believe the court must reach the constitutional question in order to determine under
Pickering whether the Attorney General's action was lawful . . .. [T]he court must
describe qualitatively the constitutional right it is placing on the scale in order to
determine whether, on balance, the government's interest is to prevail. [T]he court
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Godbold disagreed with the majority, stating that because he did not
investigate Shahar's constitutional rights for religious expression,
Bowers' revocation of her employment was unreasonable. In support
of this conclusion, Judge Godbold observed that Shahar's religion
does not do this-it does not tell us, with respect to each of Shahar's remaining claims,
where the assumed right ranks in the constitutional hierarchy.
Id. Judge Tjoflat further stated:
When a court engages in Pickering balancing, it must identify the constitutional source
of the right the employee exercised and assign weight to that right. Otherwise,
balancing cannot occur. It cannot occur any more than the local butcher can weigh five
pounds of hamburger without placing a five pound weight on the other side of the
scale. In the case at hand, the court, with respect to each of Shahar's claims, assumes
Shahar's exercise of a constitutional right without describing the right and telling us
the weight it has assigned to it. It then places on the other side of the scale the Attorney
General's interest in operating an efficient Department of Law that can command the
public's respect, and concludes that such interest outweighs what the court has
assumed and placed on Shahar's side of the scale.
I submit that if one assumes that the First Amendment protects the homosexual
relationship between Shahar and her partner as an intimate association, summary
judgment on the intimate association claim was inappropriate on the record before us.
Id. at 1113 (footnotes omitted). In support of his proposition that Shahar lacked a First
Amendment claim, Judge Tjoflat relied on two Supreme Court cases which address intimate
association as a First Amendment right. Id. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court
authoritatively positioned the right to intimate association within the gamut of the First
Amendment. 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). The Roberts Court stated that certain kinds of highly
personal relationships received constitutional protection from unjustified interference from the
state. Id. To determine whether the First Amendment protects personal relationships, the Court
laid out certain factors, "includ[ing] size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other
characteristics in a particular case [that] may be pertinent." Id. at 620. Finally, the Court in
Roberts noted that relationships "that attend the creation and sustenance of family-marriage,
childbirth, the raising and education of children, and cohabitation with one's relatives"
represent intimate relationships protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 619 (citations
omitted).
Judge Tjoflat also cited FWIPBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), to refine his
interpretation of Roberts. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 114. Tjoflat relied heavily upon the Court's
notion that "[a]ny 'personal bonds' that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than
10 hours are not those that have 'played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation
by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs."' FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 237.
Furthermore, Judge Tjoflat explained that homosexual relationships were inconsistent with the
family relationships enumerated by Roberts and failed to play a role in the development of the
Nation's culture and traditions. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1115. Although he would not restrict the
right of intimate association to familial relationships, Judge Tjoflat noted that no constitutional
protection existed for social association. Id. at 1114. Because homosexuals occupied an
insignificant role in our Nation's ideals and culture, Judge Tjoflat concluded that the right of
intimate association for homosexuals falls short of constitutional dimensions. Id. at 1115.
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recognizes homosexual marriage as an expression of faith.127
Similarly, Judge Kravitch dissented from the majority's opinion and
argued that the Pickering balance, according to Waters v. Churchill
Bowers advanced insufficient evidence in support of his action. 28
127. Id. at 1118-22 (Godbold, J. dissenting). Judge Godbold observed that the
Reconstructionist Movement of Judaism, to which Shahar belonged, recognizes homosexual
marriage as an accepted expression of faith. Id. at 1119-20. Judge Godbold further noted that
Bowers refused to investigate Shahar's religious beliefs, which caused Bowers to make an
ignorant interpretation of Shahar's motives. Id. at 1121-22. As a result, Judge Godbold
concluded that Bowers acted unreasonably in revoking Shahar's employment. Id. Judge
Godbold stated:
If the Attorney General had made reasonable investigation this case might never have
arisen. But not only did he make no further investigation, he closed the door to
knowledge. It would have been easy to confer with Shahar, or have an assistant do so,
and explore her desire to use the term "marriage" and his concern about this usage. If
she had then explained that she used the term as recommended and accepted by her
faith, the Attorney General, correctly enlightened, might have been satisfied. On the
other hand, he might have rejected her explanation as insufficient to ameliorate his
concerns. He might have explained to her his fear of possible impact on his office and
could have explored with her ways in which she might disseminate knowledge of the
religious nature of her intimate association. What we do know is that neither the
Attorney General, nor the staff members on whom this court implies he relied, made
inquiry into the religious nature of her plans.... The Attorney General walled himself
off, forbade comment or inquiry by staff members who met with Shahar, and
terminated the agreement with Shahar on his erroneous perception of the association
that she was asserting. Whatever views about possible adverse effects on his office, he
did not act reasonably.
Id. at 1222.
128. Id. at 1122 (Kravitch, S.J. dissenting). As support for her contention, Judge Kravitch
reasoned that under the Supreme Court's decision in Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994),
Bowers based his decision on insufficient or weak evidence at the time of the discharge.
Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1124. Judge Kravitch rejected the majority's argument that Bowers could
reasonably conclude that Shahar would disrupt the Workings of the Department. Id. Although
Judge Kravitch agreed with the majority that courts should give substantial weight to
government employers' reasonable predictions for disruptions, Kravitch argued the court need
not blindly accept all claims of harm conjured by government employers. Id. (citing Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994)). Judge Kravitch's dissenting opinion contains the
following excerpt from Waters:
On the other hand, we do not believe that the court must apply the [balancing] test only
to the facts as the employer thought them to be, without considering the
reasonableness of the employer's conclusions. Even in situations where courts have
recognized the special expertise and special needs of certain decision makers, the
deference to their conclusions has never been complete. . . . We think employer
decision making will not be unduly burdened by having courts look to the facts as the
employer reasonably found them to be. It may be unreasonable, for example, for the
employer to come to a conclusion based on no evidence at all. Likewise, it may be
unreasonable for an employer to act based on extremely weak evidence when strong
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Judge Barkett also dissented, because she believed that the majority
evidence is clearly available-if, for instance, an employee is accused of writing an
improper letter to the editor, and instead ofjust reading the letter, the employer decides
what it said based on unreliable hearsay.
Id. (quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 667 (emphasis in original)).
Moreover, Judge Kravitch argued that the Department's concern about negative public
perception should not afford significant weight to Bowers stated interests under McMullen v.
Carson, because catering to prejudice is not a legitimate government interest. Id. at 1125. In
McMullen, the Eleventh Circuit held that a sheriff's interest in public credibility outweighed the
Sheriff's clerical employee's First Amendment interest, which arose from the employee's off-
duty statement that he recruited for the Ku Klux Klan. 754 F.2d 936, 938-40 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
Recognizing that McMullen differed significantly from Shahar's case, the majority in Shahar
nevertheless relied on McMullen for guidance and stated:
In McMullen, both public perception and the anticipated effect that the employee's
constitutionally protected activity would have on cohesion within the office were
crucial in tipping the scales in the sheriff's favor. Nothing indicates that the employee
had engaged in a criminal act or that he had joined an organization ... that had
engaged in any criminal act. Given that it was additionally undisputed that neither the
employee's statements nor his protected expressive association hindered his ability to
perform his clerical duties and that the specific clerk performed his duties in
exemplary fashion, ... the two factors-public perception and anticipated effect-
seemed to be the only ones weighing on the sheriff's side of the scale.... But that was
enough.
114 F.3d at 1109 (internal quotations omitted).
By comparison, Judge Kravitch argued that McMullen bore no relationship to Shahar's
claim. Id. at 1125. In support of his argument, Judge Kravitch stated:
First, unlike McMullen, where the employee publicized his association with the Klan
on a television news broadcast, in this case, Shahar did not make any public
statements. Further, the sheriff's decision in McMullen was not simply based on his
prediction that the public would be biased against the Klan-affiliated employee.
Rather, the record established that "violent racism has become the Klan's trademark
... [that] [d]ivisive, confrontational tactics are used by the Klan during periods of
racial unrest in order to promote recruitment [and that] [t]hose tactics are still being
used in Florida." The sheriff and the community thus reasonably could conclude that
the Klan recruiter sanctioned such inflammatory, often illegal, activities. In contrast,
Bowers simply baldly asserted that public reaction to Shahar's pending employment
with his office would have prevented him from serving the state effectively. In light of
the Klan's undisputed history of criminal violence, public reaction in McMullen was
not only more certain, but also would have been more severe than anything which
reasonably might have been projected in this case. Finally, although public concern
over the Klan's criminally violent activities is a legitimate basis for governmental
action, the Supreme Court has now held that animosity toward gay people is an
illegitimate purpose for state policy, and thus, to prevail in the balancing of interests,
Bowers must cite more than perceived, public distaste for homosexuals.
Id. at 1125 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Therefore, Judge Kravitch concluded that Shahar's constitutional intimate association
interest outweighed any threat to the Department under Pickering. Id.
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gave great deference to Bowers' subjective views without
considering the objective standard, established in Eleventh Circuit
precedent, for finding the discharge of a public employee
constitutional.
129
Finally, Judge Birch's key dissent from the majority's opinion
was based on his conclusion that the recent Supreme Court decision
in Romer v. Evans compelled the conclusion that the Pickering
balance weighed in favor of Shahar. t30  In Romer, the Court
129. Id. at 1129-31 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Judge Barkett believed that the court should
analogize deference afforded to Bowers under the Pickering balance with the deference
afforded to law enforcement officials under Eleventh Circuit precedent. See McCabe v.
Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1571-74 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that the police chief produced
substantial evidence that the proper performance of the secretary's job required "loyalty and
keeping confidences" and that his concerns were not merely subjective, but objectively
reasonable as a matter of common experience); Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523, 1529 (11 th
Cir. 1992) (noting the absence of actual evidence that the speech in question adversely affected
the sheriff's work environment); McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 940 (lth Cir. 1985)
(holding that a law enforcement agency's discharge of an employee was valid under the First
Amendment because the employee recruited for the Ku Klux Klan, and this behavior would
adversely affect the agency's ability to perform its public duties); Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d
833, 839-40 (11 th Cir. 1982) (indicating that reasonable predictions of harm, rather than actual
evidence of harm, held less weight where a police chief and subordinate officer did not work
closely together).
In dissent, Judge Barkett argued that the ultimate inquiry when a Pickering balance is
applied in a government employment case depends on the nature of the government employer
demonstrating that the employee's constitutional rights hinder job performance, not on the
nature of the employment. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1132-33. Additionally, Judge Barkett criticized
the majority for providing Bowers with "after-the-fact reasons" to support his position. Id. at
1133. Judge Barkett explained:
IT]he majority cites to four state court decisions decided after Shahar's termination
(three of which did not involve the Attorney General's office), and three short
Attorney General opinion letters, also written after Shahar's termination. However, the
majority fails to mention post-termination evidence of Shahar's apparently successful
performance within the legal community as a staff attorney for the City of Atlanta.
Similarly, the majority indicates that the public might reasonably conclude that
Shahar engages in sodomy, and that such a belief would undermine the Department's
efforts to enforce Georgia's "laws against homosexual sodomy." The relevant Georgia
statute, however, does not define sodomy in terms of sexual orientation. The public
cannot reasonably assume therefore that homosexuals in the Attorney General's office
are more likely to engage in prohibited activity than any other member of that office.
Id. (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
Finally, Judge Barkett stated that Bowers should have the "evidentiary burden to offer
credible predictions of harm or disruption." Id. at 1133-34.
130. 114 F.3d at 1125-26 (Birch, J., dissenting) (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996)).
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invalidated, under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, an amendment to the Colorado state constitution that
discriminated against homosexuals.13 ' Because Romer declared that
malice directed at homosexuals as a class could not legitimate state
action, Judge Birch concluded that Bowers' predictions, based on
mere speculation and lacking evidentiary support, failed to tilt the
Pickering balance in his favor.I32 Judge Birch contended that Bowers'
prediction of negative public perception concerning Shahar's
homosexual status failed to legitimate his action. 133 Judge Birch
relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Palmore v. Sidoti, which
held that courts cannot convert private biases into lawful government
interest by relying on the prejudice of the public. 34 In conclusion,
131. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996).
132. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1126 (Birch, J. dissenting). Judge Birch believed that the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in Romer should have informed the court's consideration of Shahar's
intimate association claim and stated:
The import ofRomer ... is to elucidate what the Supreme Court considers not to be a
rational basis for discrimination against homosexuals. The state argued that the
rationale for the law included "respect for other citizens' freedom of association, and
in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious
objections to homosexuality." Over a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, a six-justice
majority of the Court rejected the state's rationale, declaring that "animosity toward
homosexuals" is not a legitimate basis for state action.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). Judge Birch further stated that:
Although the discriminatory conduct that occurred in Romer arose in a different
factual context than this case, I disagree with the majority's attempt to distinguish
Romer to the extent that it finds it to be wholly irrelevant. The reasoning and principles
enunciated in Romer are, in my view, highly relevant to this case and provide a
directive that, at least, should inform our analysis.
Id. n.1.
133. Id. at 1127-8.
134. 466 U.S. 429,433 (1984). In Shahar, Judge Birch explained that:
In applying the principle of Palmore to this case, the key question is not whether the
government official reasonably could assume that the public might have a negative
reaction to the employee's presence; it is whether the public's perception upon which
the official relies is itself a legitimate basis for government aalion. If the public's
perception is borne of no more than unsupported assumptions and stereotypes, it is
irrational and cannot serve as the basis of legitimate government action. In this
instance, the public's (alleged) blanket assumption that "if it's homosexual, it would
have to be sodomy" is based not on anything set forth in the record but rather on public
stereotyping and animosity toward homosexuals. Under the principles articulated in
Romer, this does not provide the state with a legitimate, rational basis to discriminate
against Shahar. Bowers' "concern" for the public's perception of homosexuals,
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Judge Birch argued that Bowers failed to infer reasonably that the
public would perceive Shahar's conduct within her marriage to be
illegal without inferring the like perception for heterosexual
employees.1
35
D. Subsequent History
On the same day the Eleventh Circuit handed down its en banc
decision, Bowers resigned from his office as the Attorney General of
Georgia. 36 Ironically, a week after his resignation, Bowers publicly
confessed that he had engaged in a decade long extra-marital
relationship with a woman who worked in the Department. 137 When
asked about the apparent double standard after revoking Shahar's
employment offer, Bowers called himself a hypocrite.'38 Shahar, on
therefore, is entitled to no weight in balancing Shahar's right of intimate association.
Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1128 (quotations in original) (footnotes omitted).
Judge Birch pointed out, for example, that Bowers did not assume that unmarried
heterosexual employees who openly dated had engaged in the illegal act of fornication under
Georgia law. Id. at 1128-29. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (1996) ("[a]n unmarried person
commits the offense of fomication when he voluntarily has sexual intercourse with another
person."). Bowers also did not assume that married employees had engaged in the illegal act of
sodomy. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1128-29.
Judge Birch elaborated this point by describing the Department's response to a discovery
motion arising out of a habeas petition by a married heterosexual convicted of sodomy:
"Bowers' Department of Law moved to strike the petitioner's motion to discover whether any
of Bowers' attorneys had themselves ever violated the sodomy law because '[t]he personal
conduct [of Department attorneys] is no more relevant than the personal conduct of Petitioner's
counsel or the Court."' Id. n.7 (quoting Brief for the Department of Law at 2-4, Moseley v.
Esposito, No. 89-6897-1 (Super. Ct. DeKalb Co.). Judge Birch explained that: "Bowers has no
reason for believing that Shahar's personal conduct would affect her abilities to ethically
represent the state, except based on an impermissible inference from her status as a
homosexual. Lawyers are trained to be advocates of legal positions with which they may
personally disagree." Id.
With these obvious discrepancies of assumption, Judge Birch concluded that Bowers'
animosity toward homosexuals did not constitute a legitimate interest that outweighed Shahar's
constitutional rights. Id
135. Id. at 1128.
136. See Bill Rankin, Lesbian's Claims Rejected Bowers Backed: Appeals Court Rules the
Ex-Attorney General Had Right to Withdraw Robin Shahar's Job Offer, THE ATLANTA
JOURNAL/CONSTITUTION, May 31, 1997, at D 1.
137. See Dick Pettys, Bowers Confesses to Lengthy, Adulterous Affair, Ex-Attorney
General Offers No Excuses, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL, June 5, 1997, at Dl.
138. Id. ("Asked how his conduct was different legally from Shahar's, he said, 'In a moral
sense, it's not.' Asked whether it was hypocritical for him to withdraw the job offer to Shahar,
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the other hand, has built a successful career in public employment.
139
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
This part highlights and analyzes the logical errors committed by
the majority in Shahar as they relate to the weight accorded to the
alleged adverse public perception advanced by Bowers. Sections A
through C address the proper standard of review in the Shahar case
and Section D analyzes the public perception factor in light of that
standard.
A. The Constitutional Question
What weight should the majority have afforded to Shahar's
assumed constitutional rights? In the opinion, the majority claimed to
give substantial weight to Shahar's constitutional rights, but never
defined these rights. 140 The Eleventh Circuit precedent has left
unresolved the question whether homosexuals possess the First
Amendment right to intimate association. 141 Without controlling
precedent, the Shahar majority cannot assign weight to an abstract
constitutional right without first analyzing it under the maximum
weight possible. The maximum weight possible, as Judge Tjoflat
suggested, is the weight assigned to heterosexual marriage.1
4 2
Summary judgment against Shahar hardly seems proper if
homosexual marriage is assigned the same weight as heterosexual
marriage.
he said, 'In a moral sense, yes. But legally, I do not believe there was any ... alternative. Did
that make me a hypocrite? Yes.').
139. See Ideas For Our Community; Shahar Still Fighting For Principle, Editorial, THE
ATLANTA JOURNALICONSTITUTION, November 3, 1997, at A10.
140. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1106. See also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
141. See McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Bates v. Hunt, 3 F.3d 374
(11th Cir. 1993); McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936 (1Ith Cir. 1985); Waters v. Chaffin, 684
F.2d 833 (11th Cir. 1982). See also supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
142. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1115-16 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). See also supra notes 126-27 and
accompanying text.
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B. The Logical Error
Should the Shahar majority have relied on the fact that, in the case
law, a subordinate attorney has never successfully challenged a chief
attorney's adverse employment decision to conclude that Bowers
acted reasonably when he discharged Shahar? The majority opinion
observed that no reported decision has ever reinstated a subordinate
lawyer's employment over the chief lawyer's objection. 143 However,
the cases relied upon by the majority, such as Bates v. Hunt'44 and
McMullen v. Carson,145 simply do not support such a proposition.
Bates, for example, involved a political affiliation question.146 In
Shahar, however, political affiliation was never an issue. Moreover,
had political affiliation been the focus of Shahar, then the court
should have examined the case under controlling authority from the
Supreme Court, such as Elrod v. Burns147 and Branti v. Finkel,
148
which, as discussed above, stand for the proposition that a public
employer can permissibly dismiss policymaking employees due to
their political affiliation. The majority's decision to ignore Elrod and
Brand amply demonstrates that the conclusion that a chief attorney
possesses unrestrained power to fire subordinate attorneys is
fictional, because these cases limited such power.
Moreover, McMullen stood for the proposition that a government
employer's prediction of future harm is reasonable if it is based upon
present, actual, and adverse public perception. 149 In Shahar, Bowers
never presented evidence that the public, at the time of discharge,
would have had an adverse reaction. Granted, as Connick v. Myers,
established, the government employer need not wait for adverse
public reaction before discharging an employee; however, such
predictions of adverse public reaction must be reasonable. 150 The
following section sets forth this reasonableness standard.
143. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104. See also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
144. 3 F.3d 374 (1 1th Cir. 1994). See also supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
145, 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985). See also supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
146. Bates, 3 F.3d at 376. See also supra note 69-71 and accompanying text.
147. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). See also supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
148, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). See also supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
149. 754 F.2d 936, 940 (1 Ith Cir. 1985). See also supra notes 77-80 and accompanying
text.
150. 461 U.S. 138, 149-54 (1983). See also supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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C. The Legal Standard
Which legal standard should the Shahar court have used to
analyze the reasonableness of Bowers' decision to revoke Robin
Shahar's employment offer? The court relied on a subjective standard
to weigh the reasonableness of Bowers' predictions of adverse public
perception. 151 In doing so, the majority ignored Eleventh Circuit
precedent from McCabe v. Sherritt 52 and McMullen v. Carson.153 For
example, in McCabe, the court recognized as decisive the police
chief s submission of substantial and objectively reasonable evidence
that his personal secretary's proper performance required loyalty and
the ability to keep confidences. 54 Similarly, in McMullen, the court
held that because the KKK has a history of violent activity a police
chief could reasonably conclude that retaining a member of the Klan
as a staff member would result in tension between the police
department and the Black population.155 Eleventh Circuit precedent,
therefore, stands for the proposition that courts must use an objective
legal standard to determine reasonableness in employment contexts.
A subjective standard makes the Pickering balance superfluous
because under such a standard, the balance always weighs in favor of
the public employer. The subjective standard actually transforms the
Pickering balance into a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
government employer, which circumvents controlling authority from
the Supreme Court. As the following Section suggests, according to
an objective standard, summary judgment against Shahar was
improper.
D. Public Perception
The Shahar court held that Bowers' conclusion that the public
would negatively perceive Shahar's marriage to another woman as
equivalent to violating Georgia's sodomy laws, thereby harming the
151. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1129-31 (Borlect, J., dissenting). See also supra note 129 and
accompanying text.
152. 12F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1994).
153. 754F.2d936(IlthCir. 1985).
154. McCabe, 12 F.3d at 1572-73. See also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
155. McMullen, 754 F.2d at 938. See also supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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Department's public image was reasonable. 156 Further, the majority
held that Shahar's ceremony would confuse the public about her legal
marital status and about Bowers' attitude regarding same-sex
marriages.157 In light of an objectively reasonable standard regarding
public perception, these holdings are clearly in error.1
58
Under an objectively reasonable standard, the majority lacked any
reason to find Bowers' conclusion that Shahar's intimate involvement
with her lover was equivalent to the public's perception of such
involvement as violating Georgia's laws against sodomy. 159 First, the
Georgia law against sodomy does not distinguish between
homosexual and heterosexual sodomy.1 60 Though homosexuals have
long been the subjects of prejudice in this country, the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give effect to such discrimination. 6' Likewise,
156. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104-06. See also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
157. Id. See also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
158. For example, Bowers claimed that he revoked Shahar's employment offer not because
of her sexuality, but rather because of her same-sex marriage. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1105-06.
Why, then, did Bowers claim that Shahar's involvement with her lover would interfere with the
Department's ability to enforce Georgia's sodomy laws? Apparently, the Shahar court
concluded that homosexuals have an ulterior motive to advance a homosexual agenda while
employed by the government. Id. at 1108 ("[T]he Attorney General's worry about his office
being involved in litigation in which Shahar's special personal situation might appear to be in
conflict with the State's position has been bome out in fact."). Even assuming that Shahar
strongly opposed laws against sodomy, this did not distinguish her from many attorneys who
feel strongly about controversial subjects such as abortion, gun control, sexual harassment,
assisted suicide, pornography, capital punishment, etc. The Department expects staff attorneys
to uphold the law of the state regardless of their personal beliefs. Moreover, a staff attorney an
ask to be taken off a case because of strong personal beliefs. Even so, it is hard to believe that
Shahar would have had many occasions to ask to be taken off cases involving violations of
Georgia's sodomy laws.
159. See, eg., supra note 123 and accompanying text.
160. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1996). See also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
In Shahar, the court implied that the public perceived homosexuals as having a greater tendency
to engage in illegal sexual conduct than heterosexuals, especially if homosexuals consider
themselves to be married. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104-06. Under Romer, though, a court cannot
find erroneous assumptions about a class of individuals to be a rational basis for discriminating
against such persons, even if such erroneous assumptions are widespread. Romer, 517 U.S. 620,
635-36 (1996). Also, if these assumptions about homosexuals are true, the court must then infer
that the public perceives non-married heterosexuals as violating Georgia's laws against
fornication, especially if heterosexual individuals became involved in intimate relationships.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (1996). The Shahar majority impermissibly weighed the
prejudice of the public against homosexuals on Bowers' side of the Pickering balance.
161. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1128 (Birch, J., dissenting). See also supra note 134 and
accompanying text.
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Bowers could not reasonably conclude that Shahar's acts would
confuse the public about her legal marital status and about his
position on same-sex marriage, especially considering that Shahar
neither married within Georgia nor attempted to claim any marriage
benefits from the state.
162
Finally, Bowers claimed to lose confidence in Shahar's ability to
make good judgments for the Department because she failed to
appreciate the fact that her same-sex marriage would bring
controversy to the Department. Bowers' line of reasoning resembles
the arguments in Lumpkin v. Jordan,163 Zook v. Brownt16 and Wood v.
Ruppe165 Unlike the parties in those cases, however, Shahar never
exploited her position in the Department to advance her views on
homosexuality or same-sex marriage. The only controversy that
Shahar could have brought to the Department would have derived
from public animosity against homosexuals. Under Latino Officers
Association, Bowers would have needed to present some credible
evidence to show the injury to his department that adverse public
perception could cause. 166 With or without such evidence, Briggs v.
North Muskegen Police Department would have rejected the
department's justification of its discharge of Shahar based upon
nothing more than the community's animosity. 167 As in Romer v.
Evans, the Government has no permissible interest in maintaining the
prejudicial whims of the public. 168 The Shahar court shaped the law
162. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1106. See also supra note 101 and accompanying text. Even
assuming that the public gained knowledge of the facts surrounding Shahar's marriage, people
often recognize that marriage within a religious faith is not synonymous with marriage under a
state license. Even if the facts surrounding Shahar's marriage status were uncertain due to a
lack of evidence, the majority claimed to accept Shahar's view of the facts. Shahar, 114 F.3d at
1100. Nevertheless, the Shahar court did not follow those facts to their logical conclusion.
Finally, if Bowers failed either to submit to the court any finding of public confusion, or to state
reasons for such confusion, then the court should not repair this deficiency by post-hoe
determinations.
163. No. C-93-4338, 1994 WL 669852 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 1994). See also supra notes 55-
57 and accompanying text.
164. 865 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1989). See also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
165. 659 F. Supp. 403 (D.C. 1987). See also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
166. Latino Officers Ass'n, 1997 WL 473972, at *4-*6. See supra notes 63-65 and
accompanying text.
167. 563 F. Supp. 585, 592 (W.D. Mich. 1983). See also supra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text.
168. 517 U.S. 620,636 (1996). See also supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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to advance public prejudices at the expense of an individual's
constitutional rights, and opened the door for government employers
to turn a speculative public murmur into a discriminatory sonic
boom.1
69
The following Section proposes a calibrated scale to balance the
government employer's interest in maintaining public support against
the government employee's interest in constitutional protection. In
addition, the Section sets forth the reasons why, absent legislative
anti-discrimination statutes, courts should grant homosexuals
constitutional protection.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
The Pickering rule balances the constitutional rights of a
government employee against a government employer's interest in
maintaining a functional and non-controversial office. 70 As the
preceding Section suggests, the Pickering balance becomes illusory
when a subjective fear of adverse public perception weighs in favor
of the government employer. An objective standard for analyzing the
government employer's predictions of adverse public perception
better serves the balancing purposes of the Pickering rule.171 The
following set of objective factors would guide courts in determining
whether, in a given case, the guise of adverse public perception
would impermissibly shield government employers who infringed
upon their employees' constitutional rights.
169. Courts should not erect a burdensome judicial barrier that government employers must
hurdle when faced with the discharge of an untrustworthy employee. However, it hardly seems
burdensome to require government employers to act reasonably in advancing their interests in a
challenged discharge, or to prevent government employers from justifying discriminatory action
under the guise of adverse public perception. For example, it is difficult to imagine that the
Shahar court would have upheld Bowers' decision if Shahar had married a Black male, which
used to be illegal in Georgia.
The Warren Court held miscegenation statutes unconstitutional in the late 1960's and
barred the government from using public outcry against inter-racial marriage to justify such
class-wide discrimination. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Statutes against
homosexual sodomy, however, have been upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional under
state police power. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
170. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). See also supra notes 12-
20 and accompanying text.
171. Seesupra Part II.C.
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1. Has the Government Employer Adequately Investigated
Whether the Employee's Conduct Would Harm the
Department?
An inquiry by the government employer to determine whether the
acts of the employee in question would harm the Department would,
at least, open communication between the two parties. The
government employer needs to first ascertain whether the rights that
the employee asserts enjoy constitutional support and, if so, the
employer should convey to the employee the its policy on such
matters. If the government employer decides to discharge the
employee after this dialogue, then the employer should set forth in
writing the reasons for the discharge. 72 This simple procedure
prevents the government employer from making post-hoe
rationalizations for his/her decision. Furthermore, the government
employer's inquiry into the employee's rights potentially saves
significant amounts of tax dollars defending the employment
decision. 173 Finally, this inquiry might produce some credible
evidence of the reasonableness of a decision to discharge the
employee in question, which evidence will constitute the second
factor.
2. Has the Government Employer Sustained the Evidentiary
Burden of Producing Credible Predictions of Adverse Public
Perception?
The government employer should bear this evidentiary burden
because adverse public perception is easy for the employer to claim
and difficult for the employee to refute. The government employer's
presentation of credible evidence of harm would ensure that judges
possess the facts necessary to rule on the issue adverse of public
172. Whether reasonableness exists in an adverse employment decision depends on the
employer's thoughts at the time of the decision. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097,
1120 (11th Cir. 1997) (Godhold, J. dissenting) ("[P]ost-event rationalizations of what [Bowers]
might have done, thought up afterwards in ivory towers, will not do.").
173. Had Bowers discussed his concerns with Shahar, the parties might have established a
working relationship to serve better both the Department and the public. A government
employer who acts in ignorance necessarily risks an irrational decision.
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perception. Granted, in cases like McMullen v. Carson no reasonable
trier of fact would find a lack of adverse public perception.174 In cases
where pubic perception is unclear, however, credible evidence
presented by the employer helps to clarify some of the uncertainty. 75
3. Is Public Perception Based Upon Class-Wide Prejudice or
Upon Legitimate Government Concerns?
Courts must determine whether a government employer's adverse
employment action relies on public prejudice or on a legitimate
government concern. This determination ensures that government
employers cannot act according to their own personal biases under
the guise of public prejudice. 176 Under this factor, no governmental
entity would be able to adopt public prejudice as a rationale for
discharging an employee motivated, in fact, by arbitrary
discrimination.1 77 Without an assessment of the reasonableness of a
174. See 754 F.2d 936 (1 Ith Cir. 1985). See also supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
175. Credible evidence of public opinion becomes especially significant when the
government employer initiates a double standard toward various classes of employees under the
guise of adverse public perception. This problem is self-evident in associating the status of an
individual with the individual's sexual conduct. For example, firing a homosexual based upon
alleged sexual conduct without determining whether heterosexuals engage in the same conduct
establishes a double standard. Firing a homosexual based upon public perception of alleged
sexual conduct without determining whether the public perceives heterosexuals in the same
manner also establishes a double standard. Any double standard reeks of discrimination, and
evidence based on such a double standard cannot constitute the type of credible evidence
necessary to permit a government employer to compromise the constitutional rights of a
government employee.
176. This country, since its inception, has struggled against class wide discrimination.
Although many walls of prejudice have tumbled, many obstacles remain. Discrimination
against homosexuals remains one of the few prejudices still endorsed by large segments of the
public. Some public officials likely hold private biases against homosexuals. These private
biases, however, must not be converted into law under the guise of an alleged prejudice of the
public. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1128 (Birch, J., dissenting). Public malice toward a class of
individuals is not a legitimate government action. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36
(1996).
177. See, e.g., Chris Bull, War of the Words, THE ADVOCATE, July 21, 1998, at 13. The
article cited a letter from Sen. Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.) to Sen. Trent Lott (R-MS), which
stated:
I fear that Mr. Hormel's nomination [for U.S. ambassador to Luxembourg] is being
obstructed for one reason, and one reason only: the fact that he is gay. In this day and
age, when people ably serve our country in so many capacities without regard to
sexual orientation, for the United States Senate to deny an appointment on that basis is
simply wrong. What's more, on a personal level, I am embarrassed that our
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government employer's interest in avoiding adverse public reaction,
the heterosexual majority can refuse homosexuals the safeguards that
other individuals enjoy. Moreover, unlike most minority classes,
homosexuals receive no protection from federal legislation.1
78
Without protection from arbitrary discrimination, homosexuals are
forced to seek justice from the courts, which must refuse to convert
public prejudice into a legitimate governmental interest.17 9
4. Does Public Perception, as a Justification for Adverse
Employment Decisions, Deny a Government Employee His or
Her Constitutional Rights?
The Constitution protects individual action, not lifestyles. 8
Legislatures pass laws to compel or prohibit certain individual
actions. The judiciary determines, inter alia, whether legislative acts
pass constitutional muster. In the absence of judicial or legislative
action, however, influencing public perception becomes the only way
for minorities to safeguard their constitutional rights.'' But what
happens if, and when, the majority denies individuals their
constitutional rights?
The answer to this question comes from history of the civil rights
movements of Black people and women. Because homosexuality
Republican Party, the Party of Lincoln, is seen to be the force behind this injustice.
Id.
178. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text (discussing legislative attempts to protect
homosexuals).
179. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-36. See also supra notes 130-34 and accompanying
text.
180. See RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAv 131
(1988). Mr. Mohr stated:
[Tihe Constitution does not protect lifetimes or even lifestyles. Rather it protects
particular instances of actions from legal coercion. As in the case of associations, if a
lifestyle is protected, it is so because an individual has rights to perform certain
actions; a person does not have a right to perform certain actions because she has a
certain lifestyle.
Id.
181. Seeid. at179.
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differs from race and gender in that homosexuals are present in every
cross-section of society, the answer will inevitably have
distinguishing characteristics from Black people and women, and
must then be addressed ab initio as it applies to homosexuals.
For homosexuals, denial of their individual rights arises from
public stigma and willful ignorance about homosexuality. 1 2 The
heterosexual majority's willful ignorance about homosexuals allows
widespread hatred to veil the irrationality of their beliefs. With this
stigmatization of homosexuals established, the heterosexual majority
does not need a compelling reason to justify its discrimination. 183
Because homosexuals do not have physical features to set them
apart from the majority, as do ethnic minorities, they are able to
conceal their status from employers, neighbors, family, and friends.18 4
In that light, homosexuals can avoid social animosity by deciding not
to participate in the political forum. 5 If, for instance, homosexuals
assembled or petitioned the government, they might inadvertently
reveal their status to unwitting eyes, such as their employers.
186
Accordingly, homosexuals risk losing their employment and, hence,
their means of earning a living if they reveal their homosexuality.
Without adequate protection from legislatures or courts, homosexuals
cannot obtain for themselves the constitutional rights enjoyed by the
182 For example, homosexuals often are the brunt of jokes, physical and mental abuse,
religious intolerance and media stereotyping. See id. at 22-27. Society stereotypes homosexuals
as child-molesters, sexual deviants, cross-dressers, gender psychotics, etc. See id. Stereotypes
keep the stigmatized group in conformity with the status quo of the majority's society. See id. at
24.
183. Seeid at 179.
184. This ability to conceal one's homosexual identity makes "coming out" such a
paradigm shift in the homosexual lifestyle. See id. at 22. This decision means accepting one's
homosexuality, which is often the most difficult step, and freeing one's self from the prison of
public condemnation. More often than not, homosexuals "come out" only partially (i.e., only to
friends and family), and continue to hide their status from banks, insurance companies,
hospitals and employers. The purpose of a "partial closet" comes from homosexuals' desire to
get loans, insurance policies, adequate health care and employment without discrimination.
Because of public stigmatization, hiding in a half-open "closet" remains the only rational short-
term solution for homosexuals to achieve non-discriminatory treatment. Granted, homosexuals
may be unwitting participants in their own oppression, but the choice between life and
livelihood is difficult.
185. Seeid.at 173.
186. See id.
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majority.1 87  As a consequence, public stigmatization deprives
homosexuals of their constitutional rights and freedoms.
Thus, absent legislative action, courts must protect homosexuals
from a political system that denies them the constitutional rights
afforded to the majority. Courts need not don the legislative hat and
make new law. In the case of government employment, though,
reference to public prejudice to justify the discharge of a homosexual
employee simply fails to create a compelling argument. 8' Using the
Pickering balancing test, class-wide discrimination based on public
hatred should not outweigh the constitutional rights of a homosexual
government employee. Denying public employment to homosexuals
denies them constitutional freedoms, something the courts cannot
sanction.
CONCLUSION
Absent adequate anti-discrimination legislation to protect
homosexuals from arbitrary employment decisions, the courts must
refuse to shape the law according to public prejudice and to the
detriment of constitutional protections. Giving public prejudice the
force of law both abandons all notions of justice and establishes a
legal foundation to discriminate on a class-wide basis. Shahar v.
187. See id. Mohr stated:
Only when the government protects gays against discrimination in housing,
employment, and public accommodation will gays have first amendment rights as
powers. For all potentially effective political strategies involve public actions. More
specifically, all the actions protected by the first amendment are public actions
(speaking, publishing, petitioning, assembling, associating). Now, a person who is a
member of an invisible minority and who must remain invisible, hidden, and secreted
in respect to her minority status as a condition for maintaining a livelihood is not free
to be public about her minority status or to incur suspicion by publicly associating with
others who are open about their similar status. And so she is effectively denied all
political power-except the right to vote. But voting aside, she will be denied the
freedom to express her views in a public forum and to unite with or organize other
like-minded individuals in an attempt to compete for votes which would elect persons
who will support the policies advocated by her group. She is denied all effective use of
legally available means of influencing public opinion before voting and all effective
means of lobbying after elections are held.
Id. at 173.
188. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996). See also supra notes 130-34
and accompanying text.
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Bowers stands as but one example of a vast array of anti-homosexual
discriminatory conduct. Before this country can evolve into a society
of true individual freedoms, it must eradicate the virus of homosexual
discrimination.
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